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I. INTRODUCTION 
As cloud computing increasingly takes the center stage in an organization’s IT infrastructure, 
it provides a huge incentive for hackers to gain illegal access to virtualization environments. 
Therefore, new virtualization security solutions will need to be developed to counter these 
attacks.  
Virtualization enables a layer of abstraction through device emulation, and facilitates 
resource sharing among multiple guests running different operating systems in the form of 
virtual machines (VMs). 
A virtualization environment consists of multiple guest VMs and the virtual machine monitor 
(aka. hypervisor) running between VMs and the hardware to regulate their access to the 
underlying resources. With the wide use of virtualization technology, the underlying 
virtualization infrastructure is becoming a popular target for attacks. Attacks such as 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and privilege escalation are launched against the 
virtualization environment. 
Existing virtualization security techniques to protect the virtualization infrastructure against 
attacks are limited in the protection scope and often incur high level overheads in a real-
world deployment.  
In this research we will investigate a memory-based virtualization security approach. 
Through combining protected in-VM monitoring with mandatory access control (MAC) using 
SELinux, our proposed approach aims to provide comprehensive protection of both the 
guest virtual machines and the underlying hypervisor against attacks, without incurring high 
level overheads. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. A literature review is presented in Section 
2, and the limitations of existing virtualization security techniques are discussed in Section 3. 
A new solution is proposed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the prototype while the future 
work is set in Section 6. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
In mandatory access control (MAC), access to resources is controlled and determined by the 
system administrator through access policies. This centralized approach to resource access 
control is different from discretionary access control (DAC), in which access to an object is 
determined by the object owner [1]. 
Based on Bell-LaPadula (BLP) access model [2], MAC assigns sensitivity levels to objects 
(resources) and clearance levels to subjects (users) which reflect their significance within the 
system. They are then used to define access policies which are enforced whenever a 
subject makes a resource access request. MAC can be implemented based on Linux 
Security Module (LSM), which is commonly existent in modern Linux kernels. 
A MAC scheme typically consists of three components, namely, reference monitor, 
enforcement hooks and access control policies, as depicted in Figure 1. Reference monitor: 
is responsible for monitoring all resource access requests [3]. It uses the access 
enforcement hooks to intercept any resource access request and deliberates about the 
request according to a set of pre-defined access policies [4]. 
Access enforcement hooks: are invoked when a guest VM makes a resource access 
request. They intercept any resource access from the VMs and pass the intercepted 
information to the reference monitor. Access control policies (ACM): are a set of rules 
defined by the administrator to determine which resources a user is allowed access to as 
well as at what privilege levels. Access control policies are used by the reference monitor to 
determine whether a given resource access request should be granted. 
 
A MAC-based virtualization security solution by [5] uses an access control module (ACM) to 
deliberate about resource access requests according to a set of access control policies. The 
policies are defined using Simple Type Enforcement (STE) and Chinese Wall Enforcement 
(CWE). While this enables fine-grained resource access control, the centralized nature of the 
ACM module means that it is vulnerable to hypervisor-targeted attacks. 
 
This was extended in [6] to their sHype access control solution. It leverages the guest 
isolation property of the 
hypervisor by enforcing STE and CWE access control policies for every resource access 
request. However, it does not provide mechanisms to maintain the MAC policies associated 
with a guest VM during VM migrations. sHype was extended in [7] to Shared Access Monitor 
(Shamon). It uses a physical TPM hardware for remote attestation, as well as MAC VMs to 
monitor inter-VM communication. Whenever two hosts want to communicate to enable inter-
VM communication, a shared reference monitor is created which combines their access 
control policies before communicating via a IPSec-enforced communication channel. While 
this ensures the proper enforcement of MAC policies, it is impractical to be deployed on a 
real-world multi-host environment due to potential high-level overhead. 
 
B. Linux Security Modules (LSM) 
 
Linux Security Module (LSM) is designed to support different Linux security schemes and 
can be run as kernel modules without causing compatibility issues with the main Linux kernel 
[8]. LSM itself does not contain the logic to perform access control, but it provides the 
software infrastructure required for security modules to access the internal kernel data 
structures. 
 
LSM provides function hooks which are placed at critical points within the kernel. They are 
then connected to the internal kernel data structure objects by adding an additional security 
field which points to the functions [9]. Since both Xen Cloud Platform (XCP) and Kernel-
based Virtual Machine (KVM) are Linux based, LSM can be used to implement MAC-based 
VM resource access control in platforms built upon XCP or KVM. Figure 2 illustrates how 
LSM works. 
 
LSM is used in the Usable Mandatory Integrity Protection (UMIP) solution by [10]. It protects 
the system against network-based attacks by categorizing processes into lowand high-
integrity levels. It uses the file information stored in the existing DAC access control to 
determine the binary programs and files which need to be protected. The information is then 
used to generate Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policies detailing a program’s access 
privileges to a file. 
 
LSM is incorporated with POSIX 1.e access control policy in [11] in their Lothlorien by using 
the Extended Attributes (EA) functionality to add security-specific information to the files’ 
metadata. It uses the LSM hooks to intercept the user resource access request and extracts 
the request details, and then compares them with the entries in the policy database. While 
the separation of users and resources by zones helps to prevent privilege escalation attacks, 
it compromises usability since it does not allow a user to access files in different zones. 
 
LSM is also used in MAC-based malware and rootkit detection solution in [12]. The process 
information is obtained by using LSM to intercept the system calls which are activated when 
a process is executed. They are then passed to the monitoring module to determine its 
legitimacy. The monitoring module is protected by using a MAC-based protection scheme to 
ensure that only whitelisted processes can access it.  
 
C. Security-enhanced Linux (SELinux) 
 
Developed by the National Security Agency (NSA), SELinux works alongside the existing 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) to provide fine-grained resource access control. It 
combines the elements of Type Enforcement (TE), Role-based Access Control and Multi-
level security (MLS) to provide flexible mandatory access control (MAC) [13]. SELinux 
assigns to subjects and objects security contexts, which are security attributes describing the 
access privileges associated with their access. A security context in SELinux is of the form 
user:role:type, each of which plays an important role in the specification of access control 
policies and can best be explained in reverse order. The type identifier is used by SELinux to 
enforce Type Enforcement (TE), which is the default access control in a SELinux-enabled 
Linux environment. It uses the types associated with subjects and objects to specify access 
control policies detailing objects [14]. The type enforcement helps ensure that no user has 
complete access to the objects even for a root user, preventing privilege escalation attacks. 
 
The role identifier refers to the SELinux role which a given subject (process) is running 
under. While not used in a TE policy specification, it is used to limit the types which a 
process can be associated with in the system by associating users with the processes which 
they are allowed to run. 
 
The user identifier refers to the SELinux user label of the process which created the object, 
and is used by SELinux to define policies. The user identifiers are then mapped to the users 
in the system, making it easier to perform access control among multiple users. It is used in 
SELinux together with the role identifier to specify the processes and files which a SELinux 
user can access, allowing for more finegrained access control. 
 The SELinux architecture consists of four components, namely, the SELinux hook, Access 
Vector Cache (AVC), the Security Server and the SELinux Security Policy. Figure 3 
illustrates how SELinux works alongside the Linux Security Modules (LSM). SELinux is used 
in Virtual environment Secure File System (VSFS) [15] on the Xen virtualization platform. It 
uses SELinux to generate MAC policies by incorporating guest VM access privileges with 
their IP addresses in policy definition. The binding of IP addresses in the policy definition is 
not practical in a real-world environment, as it prohibits an owner from making changes to a 
file from another VM. 
 
This limitation is addressed in [16] to protect the High Performance Computing (HPC) nodes 
against attacks. The user name and the group to which the user belongs is used instead of 
IP addresses in policy definition, improving the users’ ability to access the files. 
 
SELinux is incorporated with on-board Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in the MAC-based 
distributed usage control solution [17]. The SELinux policy associated with the file and the 
user is converted into an Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) document 
and sent to the user client to ensure consistent enforcement of access control. While this 
approach can be adapted in a virtualization security context to ensure that the access rights 
associated with a virtual machine is maintained across host migrations, the need for TPM 
presents a drawback as not every server is equipped with it. 
 
D. Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) 
 
Originally proposed in [18] to protect the monitoring tool from malware compromise, VMI 
monitors the guest VM activities by using information about the hardware on which the guest 
VM is running (e.g., physical memory) to estimate the state of the applications running within 
it. Figure 4 illustrates how VMI works. 
 
The VMI-based solution [18] consists of an OS interface library and a policy engine. The 
monitoring module uses the former to access the guest OS while the latter is used for threat 
detection. While this protects the monitoring tool integrity by running it in a separate VM, it is 
limited in obtaining a comprehensive view of its internal state. An alternative rootkit detection 
approach [19] reconstructs the storage and memory contents of a guest VM based on 
external observations. While this approach achieves a certain degree of success in its 
attempt to bridge the semantic gap, the potential reconstruction overhead in a multi-VM 
environment will affect the overall virtualization environment performance.  
 
 
 
VMI is incorporated in [20] with forensic memory analysis (FMA) and machine learning to 
implement a malware detection prototype. While this solution provides automatic malware 
detection using a machine learning algorithm, it fails to prevent hardware-based attacks. 
 
III. LIMITATION OF EXISTING TECHNIQUES 
 
Protecting the virtualization environment against attacks requires protecting both the guest 
virtual machines as well as the underlying hypervisor. Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) 
enables the external monitoring of a guest VM’s internal state by using the information 
obtained at the hypervisor level to infer its state. 
 
While this protects the monitoring components (e.g., the memory scanner, signature 
database, etc) from compromise, it suffers from the semantic gap which exists between the 
actual VM internal state and the information obtained through external monitoring. In 
addition, it does not scale well in a real-world multi-guest environment where guests tend to 
migrate across hosts during their lifetime. 
 
Protecting the hypervisor through Mandatory Access Control (MAC) allows for a centralized 
resource access control. The use of the Linux Security Module (LSM) together with SELinux 
enables the specification of fine-grained access control policies which can be assigned to 
guest VMs based on their intended purpose, further enhancing the isolation among them. 
However, the complexity associated with defining SELinux access policies leaves the 
security administrator prone to making mistakes in policy specifications. This can result in 
creating additional security vulnerabilities within the virtualization environment for attackers 
to compromise it. 
 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION  
 
Our proposed solution is based on three ideas: protected in-VM monitoring; mandatory 
access control (MAC)-based hypervisor protection; and the leveraging of the functionalities 
of existing virtualization platforms and management solutions. Figure 5 illustrates the 
conceptual diagram of our proposed solution. 
 
A. Protected monitoring module 
 
Inserted into the guest VM’s kernel space on the creation of a guest VM, the security monitor 
is responsible for monitoring the operations within the guest VM. It performs two functions, 
namely, to periodically calculate the hash values of the guest VM’s process table and to 
examine the system call requests. When the VM is first created, the security monitor 
calculates the hash value of the memory contents and stores it. It periodically calculates the 
hash value of the guest VM’s process table and compares it with the stored value. The hash 
values are then passed to the control monitor, which compares it with previously obtained 
values. The access logs within the guest VM will also be examined for signs of authorized 
access. The results from these two analyses will indicate the presence of a malware attack. 
When a process running in the guest VM’s user makes a system call request, the monitoring 
module intercepts the request before passing it to the kernel for execution. The parameters 
of the system call are examined to determine if it is making a valid request, based on a pre-
defined list of critical processes (such as the shell console, netcat, etc). Its security context is 
then used to consult the pre-defined SELinux policies to determine its access privileges 
before granting the request. SELinux will be used to assign a unique security context 
for the module, allowing it to run in a confined domain and protecting it against malware 
compromise. The assigned security context will be shared only between the module and the 
control monitor running on the management VM, thus preventing its access even if the 
attacker has obtained root access to the guest operating system. 
 
B. MAC-based hypervisor protection 
 
While the guest VMs will be protected through protected in-VM monitoring, the security of 
the hypervisor will be enforced through mandatory access control. When a VM is created, it 
will be assigned with the access policies which reflect its intended purpose. Requests made 
by the guest VM will be granted by looking up the SELinux security policies defined in the 
hypervisor protection module running in the hypervisor. Any attempts by the guest VM to 
violate the assigned access policies will be notified to the control monitor running within the 
control VM. 
 
V. PROTOTYPE AND TEST SCENARIOS 
 
A. Prototype platform 
 
The HPC (High Performance Computing) servers from our VOTER (Virtualisation Open 
Technology Research) lab are used in the exploration of the proposed virtualization security 
solution. Xen Cloud Platform is installed on each of the HPC nodes, with one node acting as 
the controlling node. Using Apache CloudStack, all these nodes have been combined into a 
resource pool enabling the guest VMs to migrate from one host to another. Figure 6 shows 
how the infrastructure is set up. 
 Monitoring of the guest VM internal state: In order to monitor the guest VM’s internal state, a 
monitoring module is placed within its kernel space upon its creation. The module intercepts 
the system calls from processes and determining their security contexts. 
 
The security context of the process making the request is determined by using the getcon 
function which is part of the Linux system programming application programming interface 
(API). The monitoring module is implemented using GNU C and the SELinux API. 
 
Security context identification of guest VMs through SELinux: In order to protect the 
hypervisor, the security contexts of the guest VMs need to be assigned according to their 
usages within the system. This involves analyzing the kernel source code containing the 
Linux Security Module as well as security context assignment using SELinux together with 
LibVirt virtualization library. 
 
B. Design of test scenarios 
 
The proposed virtualization security solution will be evaluated in terms of its ability to detect 
abnormalities within the guest VM as well as its overall performance overhead incurred in 
the virtualization environment. 
Measuring the effectiveness of proposed solution: The proposed solution will be evaluated in 
terms of its ability to protect both the virtual machines as well as the hypervisor against 
attacks. This will be done through subjecting it to penetration testing, as well as conducting a 
comparative study alongside alternative virtualization techniques. 
 
Kali Linux is used to determine the ability of the proposed solution to detect attacks. The tool 
provides a collection of tools to simulate different forms of attacks and will be run against the 
guest VMs by remotely simulating attacks. The ability of the solution to detect the attacks as 
well as the time taken for the detection will be measured by analysing the timestamps in the 
guest VMs’ log messages. The use of Kali Linux can be extended to determine the ability of 
the MAC-based hypervisor protection module to protect against attacks.This will help 
determine the ability of the propose solution to protect the virtualization environment against 
attacks. 
Performance analysis using existing virtualization security techniques: In order to measure 
the additional performance overhead incurred by the proposed solution in a virtualization 
environment, a comparative performance analysis will be done by implementing two existing 
virtualization security techniques. 
 
A virtual machine introspection (VMI)-based security solution based on the work done in [18] 
will be implemented, to compare the efficiency of the proposed solution in monitoring the 
guest VMs. Performance comparisons of these two approaches will give an insight into the 
performance overhead associated as well as their effectiveness. 
 
The MAC-based virtualization technique proposed in [5] will be used to compare the 
effectiveness of the hypervisor protection module. While it is implemented on a proprietary 
IBM POWER hypervisor, the techniques mentioned in the work can be adapted to the XCP 
and KVM virtualization platforms. DBench and IPerf will be used for performance analysis. 
 
VI. OUTLOOK 
 
Our proposed solution has the strength of protected in-VM monitoring and at the same time 
leverages the Linux Security Module (LSM) using SELinux. Designed to overcome the 
limitations of existing techniques, our virtualization security solution proposed will protect 
guest VMs as well as hypervisors from attacks. 
The future work will be using SELinux to define access control policies for guest VMs based 
on the principle of least privilege, and integrating it with the CloudStack management 
interface. In addition, the use of XML to convert guest VM access policies to enforce access 
control across VM migration will be explored as well. 
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